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Abstract
This paper is an attempt to theorise the commons from a perspective that sets out for 
reconciling systemism with a critical stance. According to that the concept of the commons 
is not only descriptive but also normative. The commons are defined as the systemic effect 
of synergy in social systems. However, the more suppression and exploitation are ruling, the 
higher is the extent of exclusion of actors from self-organised generation and usage of the 
synergetic effect, that is, the higher the extent of enclosure of the commons. Actually, the 
trend towards the enclosure of the commons is all-embracing and besets every subsystem of 
society. The critical stance of that theoretical position manifests itself in the endorsement of 
the reclaiming of the commons as a step towards the implementation of a good society. 
Keywords: self-organisation, synergy, enclosure of the commons, Logic of the Third, Global 
Sustainable Information Society
Resumen
Este artículo es un intento de teorizar los comunes desde una perspectiva que pretende 
reconciliar el systemism con una postura crítica. De acuerdo con esto, el concepto de los 
comunes no es solo descriptivo sino también normativo. Los comunes son definidos como el 
efecto sistémico de la sinergia en los sistemas sociales. Sin embargo, mientras mayor represión 
y explotación reinen, más amplio es el alcance de la exclusión de los actores por los efectos 
sinérgicos en cuanto a su uso y producción auto-organizada, es decir, mayor será la extensión 
del cercamiento de los comunes. De hecho, la tendencia hacia el cercamiento de los comunes 
es global y asedia a todos los subsistemas de la sociedad. La postura crítica de esa posición 
teorética se manifiesta por sí misma en el respaldo de las reivindicaciones de los comunes 
como un paso hacia la implementación de una buena sociedad.
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1. InTRODuCTIOn
This paper explores the possibility of approaching the subject of the 
commons in terms of systems thinking. So far, social systems thinking has 
been mainly associated with Luhmann’s theories. The perspective taken 
here, however, focuses on a post-Luhmannian paradigm that harnesses emer-
gentist systemism for social theory (Wan, 2011) and is very close to the Re-
lational Sociology of Pierpaolo Donati (2011). It is a realist stance and intro-
duces Critical Theory assets to systems thinking, which is important as the 
subject is highly contested and needs an approach that deals with its norma-
tive aspect in an explicit way. 
The paper brings forward a theoretical argument. 
The first section presents the basic assumptions of a critical social sys-
tems approach as to the tools it recommends, the scope it defines, and the 
aim it supports. 
All three dimensions reveal a Logic of the Third – of something that re-
lates phenomena (social systems as totality), relates agents (social relation-
ships as structure), or relates actions (social anticipations as visions). This 
Logic of the Third is elaborated by reference to Charles Sanders Peirce’s 
concepts of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness in the second section. 
Section three shows that the commons fulfil the criterion of a Third: they 
are synergetic effects of systemic self-organisation. They reside in each sub-
system of society, in the cultural, the political, the economical, the ecological 
and the scientific-technological subsystems and signify what is at stake in 
the battles of today. 
In order to disclose the commons and make them accessible to all hu-
manity and each individual in a just way, a good society must be envisaged 
and implemented. The fourth section argues that such a good society is a 
Global Sustainable Information Society. 
The latter can only be reached by overcoming antagonisms that are 
rooted in idiotist relationships that socialise actors as self-regarding rather 
than regarding a Third. However, empirical data of the last section give evi-
dence that idiotism prevails up to the present and the conditions for a trans-
formation into a good society is not imminent. 
2. CRITICAL SOCIAL SySTEmS PERSPECTIvE
When developing the so-called Salzburg Approach to Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) and Society in the years 2004 to 2010, 
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the sociology of technology I used was based upon a combination of critical 
thinking and systems thinking – of Critical Theory and Systems Theory. 
Criticism and systemism both include what I use to call the Logic of the 
Third. The Logic of the Third is the foundation of a critical social systems 
theory. 
«Criticism is a method oriented toward recognising and sublating of con-
tradictions.» This is how, in the aftermath of the 1968s, Kurt P. Tudyka (1973: 
9 –my translation) put it in his introduction to critical political science. This 
postulate, however, is directive not only for political science but for all social 
science disciplines. According to it, criticism gives particular answers to 
three basic questions social science is confronted with: 
First, which are the tools of social science? ••
Second, what is its scope? ••
And third, where does it aim at after all? ••
That is why Tudyka’s text is useful when discussing the critical stance of 
critical social systems thinking I’m advancing (see Table 1).
Table 1
Criticism and Systemism in Social Sciences
Criticism Systemism
Tools
Putting of phenomena in the 
context of social totality 
(=the third)
Putting of phenomena in the 
context of social systems 
(=the third)
Scope
dialectic of agency and 
structure (=the third)
self-organisation of actors and 
emergent relations (=the 
third)
Aims
supporting of sublation of 
antagonisms caused by 
heteronomy through 
reflexion of concrete utopias 
(=the third)
supporting of the social 
system's transformation into 
higher-order states based 
upon real possibilities (=the 
third)
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First, regarding the tools, Tudyka starts with the well-known quote of Karl 
Marx (1894) that «all science would be superfluous if the outward appear-
ance and the essence of things directly coincided.» The method of social-
scientific investigation needs to be aware of the incongruency of appear-
ance and essence and is an attempt to reveal the essence and to reconstruct 
the link between the two. Tudyka writes (1973: 12 – my translation), «Criti-
cism gains power, when it can put the object in the context of societal total-
ity, thus recaptures its illusive empirical isolation and can demonstrate its 
historical all-society character. For in the isolation of single aspects criticism 
gets lost practically and cognitively and the surface throttles critical thought». 
Thus the tools that guarantee critical thinking in social methodology put the 
object of inquiry in the context of history and society as a whole. Social to-
tality, then, plays the role of a Third that is sought after to connect the single 
aspects. By theoretically reconstructing the totality and relinking the single 
aspects to that third, social science is enabled to give a meaning to empirical 
findings and to provide scientific understanding. 
Systemism –in contradistinction to positivism– is not alien to that task. 
Proper tools for critical social methodology can be made available from sys-
tems thinking. Every kind of systems thinking is close to the idea of casting 
a third in that it is a feature of them to look upon every object as immersed 
in an overall systems context. Evolutionary Systems Theory (which is about 
complex systems organising themselves, Hofkirchner 2013a) looks upon any 
phenomenon as process or result of a process that propels evolution of sys-
temic interconnectedness. That way it works on a metalevel that provides a 
Third to weave the red thread among the object level.
This symbiosis of criticism and systemism becomes obvious when focus-
ing on the question of the behaviour («Verhalten» in German) of social ac-
tors and the social relations («Verhältnisse» in German) between them. This 
question has been attracting attention anew with Pierpaolo Donati’s para-
digm of a Relational Sociology (2011). Behaviour can be researched empiri-
cally. Not so social relations. The latter can be found only through theoretical 
endeavours. Social relations are, so to speak, what is essential for the behav-
iour, that is, what is common because it is necessary, and can be labeled 
«lawful». Social relations appear in the concrete behaviour. In systems terms, 
they are the enablers and constraints of the actions and interaction of the 
actors. They determine, to a certain extent, the behaviour of the actors. The 
behaviour can, in a way, be understood by refering to the underlying social 
relations. But no behaviour can be explained by resorting to the actors or 
agency only. Enablers and constraints are relational, they are structural in 
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nature, not actional. They are the Third that relates actors and individual 
agency realises only possibilities that are spanned by social relations. 
Second, regarding the scope of critical social science, Marx (1852) put it 
in the famous words: «Men make their own history, but they do not make it 
as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but 
under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.» 
These circumstances build an objective reality that human subjects cannot 
avoid facing when acting. That reality is known as social relations that to-
gether form the structure of society. Social theory is still divided over the 
question of how to conceive of the link between agency and structure. So-
cial critique considers it a social contradiction, that is, a dialectical relation-
ship which is said to exist once both sides of a relationship are opposed to 
each other, depend on each other, and neither can be replaced with the 
other without simultaneously replacing the mode of the relationship. In this 
dialectical relationship of agency and structure, structure is a Third because 
it relates social actors to each other. It orders the behaviour of social actors 
through opportunities that enlarge and/or limit their options.
In terms of Evolutionary Systems Theory, agents and structure are mod-
eled as being coupled in a feed forward and a feedback loop, called self-or-
ganisation, which leads to the reproduction of the system or to its transfor-
mation including possible metasystem transitions which usher in new social 
formations. Thus the object of inquiry comprises (1) the actors that interact 
to form the social system and (2) the social relations emerging from, and 
dominating, their interaction as well as (3) the interplay of actors and rela-
tions. The actors populate the so-called micro-level of the social system, 
whereas the social relations are located on the so-called macro-level. The 
macro-level is emergent to the micro-level and exerts a downward causation 
on the micro-level. The macro-level plays the role of the Third. 
Last but not least, regarding the aims of critical social science, Tudyka says 
«Science is partisan« (1973: 25 – my translation), whether you want it or not. 
Thus, it is necessary to reflect on its aims. Before the Positivism debate in Ger-
man sociology between the Frankfurt School type Critical Theory and positiv-
ist Critical Rationalism, the context of application in which scientific knowl-
edge is used to solve problems and is transformed into technologies, whether 
material or ideational, was not deemed to be scientific enough. The ideology 
of value-free science excluded it from pertaining to science. According to 
Tudyka, the task of social science should not be to mirror reality, thereby sug-
gesting the immutability of that which needs to be changed, but it should aim 
at a concrete utopia that transcends the bad empirical through the category 
of the real possible (Tudyka, 1973: 24-25). Critical social science is, in the final 
78 recerca, reviSta De PenSaMent i anÀliSi, nÚM. 14. 2014. iSSn: 1130-6149 - pp. 73-91
analysis, critical because it measures the empirical against the real possible 
that is desired. Concrete utopia (Bloch, 1967) is the Third that allows for meas-
uring. Antagonsims that are characteristic of social relations of domination are 
to be revealed in order to help sublate those antagonisms. 
Since the founding of General Systems Theory through Ludwig von Ber-
talanffy and Anatol Rapoport and others it goes without saying that Systems 
Theory is normative, too. It can describe spaces of possibilities that might or 
might not be realised by the agents. It can describe possibilities that lead 
from one state of the system to a state that better fulfils functions desired by 
the agents and marks a higher order of the social system –in which case the 
higher order is a good. And it can describe unsustainable states– which then 
are evils – and possibilities to get rid of dysfunctions harmful to agents. By 
describing goods and evils and how they can be set out for or left behind, 
systems thinking makes explicit that it is value-laden and crosses the border 
from description to prescription and provides a Third as standard of com-
parison. 
3. THE THIRD
For a better understanding of the notion of a Third it is worth revisiting 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s (2000) idea of firstness, secondness and thirdness. 
Firstness was defined by Peirce as a relation pertaining to the lower-level 
of individual agents. An individual agent in itself might be interpreted as a 
monad that has a relation to itself only. However, such a relation is far from a 
full-fledged relation. It’s the primordial relation, or the most derivative, if any. 
Secondness was defined as a relation between two interacting individual 
agents. One individual agent reaches out to another individual agent. The 
first agent relates itself to the second one. This relation might be recipro-
cated by the second one or not. In any case, such a relation is not necessar-
ily durable but volatile as it can be revoked by any side at any time. Anyway, 
it is a relation an agent acts out for another agent. As such, it is qualitatively 
different from a monadic relation. It can be named a dyad. Nevertheless, it is 
observable and describable and needs not necessarily a theory for explain-
ing it. Thus, a dyadic relation is not very far from the monadic one. It is more 
developed than the monadic once but not yet fully unfolded. It is an inter-
mediary step in the evolution and hierarchy of relations. In social systems, 
secondness is the feature of the behaviour of actors. Like the actors them-
selves, their behaviour, their actions, their network belong to the same sys-
tems level – the micro-level. 
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Thirdness, then, was defined by Peirce as a something that establishes and 
mediates the relation between two other things. According to his semiotics, 
for instance, it is a sign that is relational; it might be called representamen 
that, as a third, relates an object with an interpretant (the meaning) but the 
sign might also comprise the object and the interpretant. That is, there is a 
third that is a something that has causal power over two agents in that it is 
able to relate them to one another –and that’s what structure is capable of. 
This is a fully-fledged relation. It lends stability to the interaction of agents. 
It exists, so to say, as a triad: two relata and a relation that is not reducible to 
the mere interaction of independent agents but possesses a being in its own 
right. Relations like that go beyond mere dyads and instigate a qualitatively 
new level– the macro-level. In social systems it is social relations that make 
up the macro-level. Social relations channel the multiple and concatenated 
dyadic interactions by enablement and constraint. 
It is important to see that only the triad fulfils the criterion of a system in 
the sense of an evolutionary, self-organising system; only such a system has, 
at least, two levels –the micro– and the macro-level. A dyad is not a system 
in this sense. It contains systems, if the agents are seen as evolutionary, self-
organising systems. And, in fact, an agent can be seen as a such a system 
having a micro– and a macro-level, if the focus is on the interior of how the 
monad works. 
It is interesting to understand that after Peirce, there is no fourthness or 
fifthness as he contended against Bertrand Russell who repudiated the idea 
of firstness, secondness and thirdness because he did not see the difference 
in quality between these three relations; he did not see that there was no 
difference in quality regarding higher orders of relations; he did not see that 
every higher order relation can be broken down to amounts of first–, sec-
ond– and thirdnesses but thirdness cannot be broken down to secondness 
and firstness, and secondness cannot be broken down to firstnesses. 
Thus the most important insight is to grasp that fully-fledged relations 
play the role of the Third and cannot be reduced to the interactional rela-
tions of agents or to the individual agents themselves. There is emergence 
on the way up from the agents and their interaction to the structure of the 
system and there is a kind of dominance the way down; thirdness shapes 
secondness shapes firstness. Driven by the co– and counteraction of actors 
the build-up of social systems locks in at certain structural possibilities that 
determine possibilities for the next round of interaction in which actors can, 
more or less consciously, choose to restrict themselves to the enablements 
and constraints given by the structure or to try to extend them and bring 
about a switch to another structure. 
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4. COmmOnS
Every product of agents self-organising into a system, or self-organising 
within a system, is a relational product and has the characteristic of a Third. 
Commons are no exception (Hofkirchner, 2013b; 2013c). 
The rationale of every system is synergy. Because agents when producing a 
system produce synergetic effects, that is, effects they could not produce when 
in isolation, systems have a strong incentive to proliferate (Corning, 2003). 
In social systems synergism takes on the form of some social good. Actors 
contribute together to the good and are common beneficiaries of that good 
– the good is a common good, it is a commons. That good comes into being 
through the common effort of actors’ combined productive energies and is 
located on a social system’s macro-level. It is a relational good that influ-
ences actors on the micro-level, since it enables or constrains the actors’ 
participation in producing and consuming the good. It is a Third, since any 
build-up of social order is the build-up of something «third«. All actors con-
tribute to the emergence of that order that grants that their interactions 
become stable relations. The new structure relates the actors to each other. 
The new structure plays the role of the «third», the actors assume the roles 
of the «first» (ego) and the «second» (alter).
Since the commons is an emergent quality, it cannot be fully traced down 
to the quantity of the contribution of each actor. There is a leap in quality 
that is not fully determined by the initial conditions (which play the role of 
boundary conditions that are necessary, but not sufficient conditions). The 
same holds the other way round: there is less-than-strict determinism in top-
down emergence. Accordingly, the commons does not have the same impact 
on every actor; a quantity of the commons used by one actor may yield a 
different qualitative result than the same quantity yields in the case of an-
other actor. The actors have a share in the added value when producing it 
and they share the added value when using it; but the share the actors have 
does not account for the added value produced nor does the added value 
produced account for how much the actors share. This problem of the lack 
of reciprocal accountability between costs by, and benefits for, individual 
actors is an argument against measurements of transactions and exchanges 
between individual or aggregate actors as the basis of measures to balance 
their rights and duties in a justifiable way; individual input to, and individual 
output from, the commons is rather a matter of collective action. And for that 
reason, the only principle of a humane organisation of production and usage 
of the commons that can be supported is, in general, «from each according 
to their ability, to each according to their need». 
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In heteronomic societies, however, the production and provision of com-
mons becomes a contested field. Antagonistic relations occur. One class of 
actors  – the so-called dominating class – make a living at the cost of other 
actors – the so-called dominated classes. In the age of global challenges an-
tagonisms have been aggravating. The social (cultural, political, economic) 
crises, the ecological crises and the scientific-technological crises we are 
witnessing reveal more and more that they are battles over the whole spec-
trum of commons – battles that put the survival of humankind at risk. Each 
crisis appears in a specific social subsystem and is a conflict about the com-
mons specific for that subsystem.
In society as a social system, the common good is the inclusive commu-
nity of actors or, more precisely, the societal relations that condition the 
ideational ‘who, what and how’ – the social subject, the social object, and 
the social ways and means– of human activities that include the material 
and natural ones but go beyond mere physicality; the commons is the sphere 
that allows for the unfolding of individual ingeniousness, the space that so-
ciety provides for it; it is,
in the cultural subsystem, the realm of values or, more precisely, the ••
societal relations that condition the process of defining what (a) good 
is in a good life;
in the political subsystem, the public sphere or, more precisely, the ••
societal relations that condition the decision process on the conduct 
of a good life;
in the economic subsystem, the field of resources or, more precisely, ••
the societal relations that condition the distribution of the means for 
a good life.
All social subsystems have become battlefields of the struggle for inclu-
sion against exclusion:
the cultural subsystem has become the battlefield of the struggle for ••
inclusive definitions of selves having in mind unity through diversity 
as against parochial ways of living, nationalism and fundamentalist 
ideologies;
the political subsystem has become the battlefield of the struggle for ••
participative democracy against right-wing, technocratic or populist 
authoritarian rule;
the economic subsystem has become the battlefield of the struggle for ••
unalienated working conditions and a fair share for all against the ero-
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sion of the labour force, against the pressure exerted by the financial 
capital, against corruption, against the Matthew principle (the rich-get-
richer mechanisms) inherent in capitalist economies, etc.
In the ecological subsystem of society –in which actors produce adaptations 
to, or of, the natural environment that support human self-preservation– the 
common good is the whole human nature and the whole natural environment 
or, more precisely, societal relations that condition the material ‘what’ and the 
material ‘who’, the natural object and the natural subject, of human activities, the 
ecology and the bodies. This system has turned into a battlefield of external and 
internal nature: there is the struggle for a cautious treatment of the bio-physical 
bases of human life against their extensive and intensive colonisation. 
In the scientific-technological subsystem of society – in which actors 
produce scientific-technological innovations that enhance and augment hu-
man self-actuation – the common good is science and technology or, more 
precisely, societal relations that condition the material –the natural ways 
and means– of human activities, the physical tools and procedures. This 
system is now a battlefield of the struggle for science as a «communist», uni-
versal, disinterested and organised skeptical endeavour as Robert K. Merton 
put it 1942 in «The normative structure of science» (1973: 267-278), for tech-
nology assessment and for designing meaningful technology as against mili-
tary-industrial-complex funded research and development. 
5. COSmOPOLITAnISm
The transformation of these conflicts over the commons and the subla-
tion of these antagonisms would require actors that overcome their restrict-
ed abilities for action and extend them to include the concern for a good 
society. A good society, given the global challenges, needs to exist on a plan-
etary scale, that is, it needs to be global; it needs to be capable, by establish-
ing its organisational relations, of acting upon the dangers of anthropogenic 
breakdown, that is, it needs to be sustainable; and it needs to be capacitated, 
by means of ICTs, to create requisite wisdom, knowledge, data, that is, it 
needs to be informational. Such a society is called a Global Sustainable Infor-
mation Society (gSiS) (Hofkirchner, 2013c; 2011; 2013b).
The GSIS is rather a framework of necessary conditions to be met in or-
der to avoid the breakdown of the worldwide web of social systems today 
than a detailed blueprint. What are needed for its implementation, anyway, 
are individuals, social subjects, social systems, whose concerns are with 
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civil society, with values, and with the future of society, as Archer and Do-
nati have emphasised (2008). What is needed is another mode of reflexivity 
that establishes a meta-level thinking by human minds – the emergence of 
something new that mediates as a third between two other things on the 
human mind’s object level, relates them in a new way and gives them a new 
meaning.; by doing so, the reflexive actor repositions herself to the objects-
in-reality which are her objects-in-practice (Hofkirchner, 2013b). What is 
needed is that the GSIS is reflected as the Third to come. 
So far, human history seems to have unfolded different stages of social for-
mations that intertwine social self-organisation and social information proc-
esses. Applying the idea of monadic and dyadic relations as not fully unfolded 
relations, historical stages can, in theory, be reconstructed such that a GSIS can 
be postulated as a possible third stage of societal evolution; the second forma-
tion is thereby a negation of the first one and the third one a possible negation 
of the negation. The first two social formations have been oscillating between 
the poles of individualism and collectivism, whereas the possible third one is 
to balance individuality and collectivity (Hofkirchner, 2013b) (see Table 2). 
Table 2
Stages of  unfolding of  the social relations as a Third  
in the course of  history
tribalism idiotism cosmopolitanism
actor/structure
personifications 
of a «We»/ 
relational «We»
self-regarding «i» 
s/competitive 
relations
individuals taking 
the perspective of 
the collective/
individual 
regarding 
collective
social 
consciousness
myths ideology of the 
private
reason
means and ends
not questionable flexible means for 
given ends
both means and 
ends subject to 
deliberation
The first stage is called «tribalism» (see Donati’s typology in 2010). It ap-
peared at the dawn of humankind in face-to-face communities:
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the overall system is mystified as an all-embracing «We»; any actor is ••
kind of personification of that «We»,
myths convey tradition;••
means and ends of social life are not questioned.••
The second stage deserves the name «idiotism» (Curtis, 2013). Etymology 
shows, «idios» meant in Greek Antiquity «the personal realm, that which is 
private, and one’s own» (12). In Curtis’ view, «idios» bears also the stamp of 
being enclosed». He says that «the creation of the private through the enclo-
sure of public or commonly held resources has historically been the primary 
means by which property has been secured for private use» (12). By the 
term «idiotes», then, a person was denoted that is concerned with his per-
sonal realm only, with his own, and not with, say, the res publica and the fate 
of other human beings. Curtis convincingly demonstrates that neoliberalism, 
not only in ideology but also as a distinct social order, epitomises the princi-
ple of the «idiotes». Hence «idiotism» as signifyer of our current society. How-
ever, «idiotism» as a feature of society that functions via self-interested, self-
concerned individuals goes, in fact, back to Antiquity and even earlier social 
formations in which domination appeared – the institutionalised instrumen-
talisation of humans for one’s own interests, which goes hand in hand with 
the enclosure of the commons and the denial of free access to the latter. 
Global financial capitalism is just carrying idiotism to extremes. But it origi-
nated, as demonstrated by the Odyssey, when selfish «I»s, after having dis-
guised themselves as incarnations of the «We» overtly entered the stage of 
heteronomic societies: 
the actors became self-regarding persons of their own rather than ••
other-regarding and thinking is short-sighted and does not take into 
consideration harmful effects on other parts of the system; the struc-
tures of the social systems have been prioritising competition on the 
higher levels of society over co-operation, which is reserved for the 
lower levels;
in ideology the private is believed to be the supreme good;••
means and ends have been decoupled insofar as means are intelli-••
gently flexibilised whereas the final end stays given.
The third stage is called «cosmopolitanism», thereby referring to the gSiS:
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it shall consist in a dialectical integration of the individuals but does ••
not require their subsumption as in the first stage; it shall be based 
upon the diversity of individuals as in the second stage but serves 
their true and best interests by acknowledging that they can do so 
exclusively when in harmony with the overarching system and thus 
without doing harm to other system components; actors need to build 
up a unity-through-diversity relationship to the social system; actors 
need to be capacitated to reflect their own position and the position 
of others from the perspective of the overall social system; through 
collective reflexion of the actors the system itself can be said to be 
reflexive about its actors when assuring the improvement of condi-
tions for the social synergy to come and for the decrease of social 
frictions in the generation and utilisation of the commons;
it must be neither ideological nor mystified but as reasonable as pos-••
sible; a realistic, science-based and practical assessment of different 
paths of societal development is needed;
means as well as ends shall be questionable; no means, no ends shall ••
be given unless agreed upon in common; not only shall the means be 
variable, but also the ends shall not be constants any more.
6. HOPE FOR CHAnGE
Movements that arose in the beginnings of the current crises in the eco-
nomic subsystems such as the like the Indignados or the Occupy movement are 
part of a many events that can be looked upon as foreshadowings of a GSIS. 
However, the societal development after the 1968s was not particularly 
conducive to the formation of strong, comprehensive, deep forces made up 
of agents of change in the direction of a GSIS. In the aftermath of the oil-
crises in the first half of the seventies and on the eve of the eighties of the 
last century, the postwar boom and the blind trust in the steady improve-
ment of social life conditions lost momentum. In economy, the accumulation 
of industry capital decoupled the increase of wages from the increase in 
productivity. In technology, flexible automation displaced Fordism (mass 
production with mass consumption). In politics, Thatcherism and Reago-
nomics, the destruction of the social welfare state by liberalisation, privatisa-
tion, and deregulation were introduced. In culture, the ideology of neoliber-
alism, of «make your own luck», of individualism began to become 
hegemonic. All of that formed a pattern that connects. It was implemented 
by the advised response of the ruling classes to the decline of the profit rates 
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which had accelerated because of the accumulation of capital that could not 
find appropriate spheres of investments. And this implementation could 
capitalise the weakness of the trade union and labour movements. In the 
nineties, the financial capital began to outweigh the industrial, «material», 
«productive» capital causing several bubble implosions. In the current crises, 
the transnational financial capital is targeting national economies and the 
politicians support it by administering austerity at the cost of the 80, 90 or 
even 99 per cent of the populations instead of starting a redistribution of 
wealth and income. 
Before Against this historical background, the development of alternative 
consciousness was rather improbable, since pupils were trained for working 
as cogs in short-sighted economic interests and were not educated for grasp-
ing the big picture. Personal competence through political education and 
engagement is lacking, whereas technical and business skills and (natural) 
science education prevails. This is the result of the economisation of educa-
tion and the transformation of pupils and students in customers. «There is 
no room any more for education of man for critical self-reflection in institu-
tions that are reduced to the training function and that are reduced to con-
veying occupational information and skills in an economically efficient way» 
(Heinzlmaier, 2012: 5-6 – my translation, W. H.). These institutions do not 
provide guidance for critical thinking nor do they provide free space for it. 
Bonds to society are not established.
Youth studies reflect that situation. In 2002, the 14. Shell Jugendstudie 
coined the term «pragmatism» of the German youth which had a construc-
tive connotation. 4 years later, the follow-up study had had to find out that 
the pragmatic generation had been put under pressure by the economic 
development (Hurrelmann, 2006: 31). It had become more difficult to imple-
ment one’s projects. In the 16. Shell Jugendstudie (2010) the following ide-
als show a slight increase compared to 2002, ordered according to frequen-
cy of response from 12 to 25 years of age (http://s04.static-shell.com/
content/dam/shell/static/deu/downloads/youth-study-2010values.pdf):
friends (97 %)••
family (92 %)••
live and act autonomously (90 %)••
be hard-working and ambitious (83 %)••
enjoy life to the full (78 %)••
high living standard (69 %)••
help socially disadvantaged (58 %).••
87WOLFGANG HOFKIRCHNER  The commons from a critical social systems perspective
Thus Heinzlmaier talks of «pragmatic individualism» (2012: 4). A more in-
depth analysis shows: youth is segregated. According to the 16. Shell Ju-
gendstudie (2010), only fourty per cent of the young Germans at the bottom 
of society are satisfied with their situation compared to 84 per cent at the 
top (http://s00.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell/static/deu/downloads/
youth-study-2010satisfaction.pdf). Nearly 10 per cent of the German youth 
belongs to the so-called «precariat» which is decoupled from societal devel-
opment (Heinzlmaier, 2012: 2). It would need more than one generation to 
reintegrate them. «It’s bad if people are exploited but even worse if they 
aren’t needed for exploitation any more» (Negt, 2012: 195 – my translation, 
W. H.). 
Furthermore, says Heinzlmaier, though in so-called knowledge societies, 
reputation, income and social security depend on the level of education, 
graduates of education at the compulsory school level and trainees do not 
earn more than to live a «materialistic» life style only. They use the material 
gratifications through their job for consuming branded goods to make them 
distinctive from other groups whereas only graduates of a humanistic sec-
ondary education and students of humanities and arts seem to tend towards 
a «postmaterialistic» life style. 
In a recent survey carried out on the basis of so-called Sinus-Milieus, 50 
explorative interviews and 1.500 online interviews represent results for the 
young Austrians from the age of 14 to 29 years (integral, t-factory 2013). Ac-
cording to it, youth is split in several milieus according to which these 
groups develop different strategies for making their ways (in the following, 
these groups are ordered from the biggest one to the smallest one). 
The «hedonists» form the biggest group (more than 20 per cent). ••
Mostly, they stem from a disadvantaged social stratum. They look for a 
niche for survival, live in the here and now and are described as emo-
tional and spontaneous. They have a low level of education. They don’t 
see opportunities for them in the future. In the web they look for 
games and entertainment.
The «adaptive-pragmatics» reach 18 per cent. Their parents belong ••
mostly to the middle of society. They are flexible, oriented to the fea-
sible, and hard-working, but are not as optimistic. They use Social Net-
working Sites for keeping in touch with their friends.
The «digital individualists» form a group as big as the former. Their ••
parents are well-off. They are creative and confident to carve out their 
own place due to their better education. Information and Communica-
tion Technologies are part of organising their everyday life.
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The «conservative-bourgeois» are almost as strong as the two groups ••
above (17 per cent). They stick to the old values, set a high value on 
family and home and show self-discipline rather than self-develop-
ment. They are optimists. They are skeptical of the new media.
The «performers» have a share of 15 per cent. Their parents live at ease. ••
They are imperturbable optimists and are convinced of being able to 
hold their ground in a globalised world. They are career-fixed and be-
lieve in good opportunities to earn money. They use Social Network-
ing Sites for their career. 
The «postmaterialists» form the smallest group (10 per cent). They are ••
critical as to consumption and «materialism». They are optimistic as to 
their own fate but extremely pessimistic as to the fate of society 
though they are engaged with politics. Like the conservative-bourgeois 
they are rather skeptical of the new media. 
With regard to the reflection of society and one’s position in it, a striking 
schizophrenia is obvious in the findings. An overall share of 59 per cent of the 
German youth is optimistic, according to the 16. Shell Jugendstudie (2010), 
and only 6 per cent are pessimistic (http://s04.static-shell.com/content/dam/
shell/static/deu/downloads/youth-study-2010optimism.pdf). The Austrian 
study (integral, t-factory 2013) presents similar findings: almost two thirds of 
the young Austrians look optimistically ahead, and positive thinking is regard-
ed a must in personal matters. However, it is more detailed: at the same time 
it finds that only short of one quarter is optimistic for the future of society. That 
is, a majority believes to succeed in muddling through in spite of being part 
of society the development of which is expected to deteriorate. 
Summing up, and assuming that these studies referring to Germany and 
Austria can be generalised for other countries with similar societal back-
ground, there is no empirical evidence for the spread of consciousness 
among the youth in the Western world concerned with the Third of the com-
mons that need to be reclaimed for a just order of the social relations in the 
nascent world society. The crises of recent years exaggerated the conflict 
between the ideology of endless opportunities and the experience of a real-
ity with restricted opportunities and a lack of generally binding ideals. The 
Arab Spring and concomitant movements like those of the ‘Indignados’ in 
Spain or ‘Occupy’ worldwide can be interpreted as upheavals of the frus-
trated «materialists» rather than expressions of autonomy-oriented «post-
materialists». The motives by which they were and still are moved are «con-
cern for the job, the starting of a family, securing status, and the future at 
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large» (Kraushaar, 2012: 209 – my translation). So restricted reflexion seems 
the dominant mode. 
But there is still hope. For these protests have, at the same time, been foster-
ing the germ of growing political awareness, reflecting the economic back-
ground and of a will to change «that not only aims at the improvement of in-
dividual positions but also focuses on the political and economic structures 
and discourses and aims at changing more than one’s own situation for longer 
periods» (Heinzlmaier, 2013: 56 – my translation). Indeed, this germ has not 
developed. What remains, however, is the following: «In the aftermath of a 
revolution ideas so far exclusively associated with marginal madmen are in a 
breath promoted to an accepted foundation of the discourse» (Graeber, 2012: 
176 – my translation). In that vein, insight into the causes of the crises may 
have proliferated. Discourses may have realised that the current crises are 
expressions of a progressive enclosure of all the common goods that are gen-
erated and utilised by actors in the whole range of social systems that make 
up society. Battles over reclaiming the commons may be more easily identified 
than before – by the people and the social scientists as well. 
And there is still a foundation for hope, since social evolution as any evo-
lution of self-organising systems inheres imponderabilities, contingencies 
and serendipity – it is emergent, and situations might occur that open new 
windows to the future.
7. COnCLuSIOn
The argument is that the commons can be described in systems terms 
while retaining its normative implications. Systemism and criticism can go 
together. That which is commonly produced for common usage is a Third that 
emerges from the interaction of actors. Because of relations of domination – 
which one group of society imposes on another group – commons are pri-
vately enclosed. A Global Sustainable Information Society needs to reclaim the 
commons for all. However, the development of social relations after the 1968s 
shows that youth is not yet prepared for the requested change. 
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